Software Downloads Information: When the Party’s ideological software prevents defuse it …

INTERNATIONAL – Since the riots that took place between Uighurs and Hans in 2009, the Chinese press relates an increase in attacks against Han and “collaborators” Uighur and even police attacks or attacks sometimes exporting beyond Xinjiang.

For the party, these events are related to external destabilization. Since 2001, the authorities denounced the action on the net Uighur opposition networks (mostly refugees). Based on a communication campaign denouncing the “three forces (ie terrorism, separatism (ethnic) and religious extremism)” ( Sangu shili ), the Chinese authorities have developed a rhetoric equating nonviolent anti-colonial democratic circles (predominate), Salafi Islamist circles and the famous Islamic Party of Turkestan (PIT). The whole forming a kind of nebulous contours waves, called Dongtu (East Turkestan). In short, this strategy of “Tweedledum and Tweedledee” which equates separate political networks, lets put them in the same bag and legitimize, in the name of fighting terrorism, repression of any form of protest the authority of the CCP.

However, looking more closely, things seem much more complex. It is not to deny the existence of the now famous PIT. This small group, born in the late 1990s for the Rapprochement of Islamic nationalist networks Uighur refugees in the Pakistani-Afghan areas with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and al-Qaeda networks, operated, not without conflict and some internal splits, moulting integrating into the international jihadist movement. However, this network with a few handfuls of activists, mostly folded in the Pakistani-Afghan areas has been greatly weakened by Western intervention in their Afghan sanctuary in 2001. And what remains of the movement is harassed and decimated by strikes incessant US drone in Waziristan. In short, the Islamist micro-Uighur nebula is divided between a Muslim-nationalist political wing in the process of salafisation foreign jihadists and a handful of activists who have actually limited capacity projection Xinjiang. Circles Uighur Salafis are activated primarily on the net in order to reinterpret the Uyghur malaise in the light of contemporary neo-fundamentalist Salafi dialectic. True, some of these marginal networks operates its transformation to the “jihad of the third generation,” highlighted by the work of Gilles Kepel there a few years. Internet and social networks open indeed the door to ideological propagation modes reticular anonymized and allow to overcome the weaknesses of pyramidal organizational structures too easily identifiable and removable. They therefore constitute a threat to the Chinese government. However, this is a marginal threat because of the close control over the Chinese net but it is mostly a standard whose agitation is handy in the post-2001 context in order to moderate the pressures of human rightism Western.

outside analysts have few items to get a safe opinion concerning acts of violence reported in the Chinese press. However, if some were undoubtedly premeditated by organized cells, the majority of these acts like desperate actions and unprepared. Moreover, the PIT on its forums often only be welcomed recent without claim them. As for the anti-colonial nationalist opposition networks and intellectuals, advocates of greater political autonomy, they agree that terrorism is a political action means against-productive. In reality, the rise of Uyghur opposition on the net abroad and the increase in acts of revenge or retaliation in Xinjiang are only symptoms of a disease from which the roots are deeper.

While the Chinese state guarantees strong growth through massive investments and providing more than half the regional budget. However, the “living together”, proposed by Beijing, based on demographic and cultural homogenization sinisatrice and tight control of the autonomous region. Recent obligation to speak Mandarin throughout the Uighur school system reflects this process. The continuing support for mass immigration is also perceived by the Uighurs as a problem. Ethnic Chinese (Han) now account for 40% of the 22 million inhabitants of the region (against 6% in 1949) and Uighurs account for only 45% of the provincial population (against 75% at the time). In addition, investments to develop and make more attractive areas of colonization and the negative effects of the liberalization of the Chinese economy have helped to foster and maintain Hans at the bottom of the social ladder a significant part of society Uighur. Thus, many Uighurs, poorly trained and discriminated against on the labor market held by Hans, can not benefit from strong economic growth.

In addition, levels of surveillance and suspicion, constant checks, unfair sanctions by overzealous or corrupt officials, feed the distrust of the Uighurs. In addition, the local bases of the Party and the administration were purged of their less “patriotic” elements and pressurized. Many executives or imams do not dare intervene to “cut corners” as was done in the 1980s when frustrations become unbearable, Uighurs took to the streets, as in Urumchi in 2009, and degenerate disorders facing police repression. In the absence of dialogue between the state and society, economically marginalized sectors exposed to religious restrictions, the zeal or corruption of civil servants, are ready to condemn to express their frustration and denouncing the non-recognition of their requests or problems. The only way to vent anger flashes caused by injustice and deafness of the state is to tackle some of its representatives and privileged he defends interests: Hans or “collaborators” Uighur overzealous .

Defender of a non-negotiable national model, the Party now rejects in principle the identification of possible colonial issues, any transition to federalism or any dialogue on the fundamental redefinition of policies implemented by the State in its western margins. Like other Chinese margins now fully integrated, the Chinese state, with its long history and political vision in the long term, set a slow sinisation this territory. However, the challenge remains risky given the process of othering and isolationism generated by these policies.

Open a dialogue that would allow Uighurs to reclaim the terms of “living together” in the Chinese nation would re-legitimize the authority of the state and to defuse some of the problem but the options are currently not possible by the ideological program of the Chinese leaders.

Film Festival and Forum on Human Rights is one of the most important events dedicated to cinema and human rights worldwide. Rémi Castets is invited at the event dedicated to “Uighurs: the negation of an identity.”
“We are confident that the artistic quality of the films is needed to address violations of human dignity. Through two international competitions, Fictions and Documentaries, we show the best of Swiss and international cinema on the rights person. With high-level debates before the Council of the UN Human Rights which ignores numerous violations, we offer a forum where all issues can be discussed freely. The FIFDH is a Relay for those who put their lives on the ground “, says its director, Isabelle Gattiker. In order to know more about the festival, visit the program.